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Abstract 
There is a paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, its 
dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference). In this paper, I want to show 
that this paradox is the reason for the dynamism as well as fragility of normality. In this 
regard, I will not only argue that every normality is fragile, but also that normality can 
only be established because it is fragile. In the first part of this paper, I will present and 
re-visit Husserl’s account of normality as concordant and optimal with regard to its 
dynamic or fragile aspects. In the second part of this paper, I will apply this account to 
recent findings in phenomenological pathology regarding schizophrenia and depression 
to show how Husserl’s account could be helpful for differentiating between different 
aspects (such as concordance and optimality) as well as genetic levels of (disturbances 
of) normality. 
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1. Introduction 
A well-known critique of phenomenology, especially with regard to Husserl 
and Merleau-Ponty, is that its descriptions of experience overly emphasize the 
ordered, harmonious, or meaningful nature of experience and therefore cannot 
adequately account for psychopathological phenomena. Phenomenology thus 
presupposes a meaningful experience of the world that we all (can possibly) 
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share. Psychopathology and psychoanalysis, however, are confronted with 
patients who lack such common ground and whose experiences cannot be 
described within the frames of the normal experience of the psychiatrist.  
While Phenomenology begins with the synthesis or unity of experience, 
psychiatry or psychopathology must start with a radical difference or 
disruption; while phenomenology understands coherent and meaningful 
perception as our primary relation to the world, such a perception is merely 
secondary for psychoanalytic approaches, which considers these perceptions to 
be imaginary and already symbolically filtered (cf. Lacan, 1961). From the 
perspective of psychoanalysis, we find thus a reversal: psychopathological 
experiences, such as hallucinations, are in this regard primary or more real, 
because they are signs of a resisting (underlying libidinous) reality, i.e., non-
symbolized, bare perception (cf. Ayouch, 2009: 19). One could thus state that 
research in phenomenology understands normality, in the sense of concordant 
and unified perception, as necessary for every ‘meaningful’ or sharable 
experience. From the perspective of psychopathology, however, normality 
must always be secondary, while disruption or difference is primary. 
While I will not engage with this specific discussion or problem in this 
paper, I will argue that, as one can see in this sketched opposition, there is a 
paradox that lies at the heart of every investigation of normality, namely, how 
its dependence on its other (e.g., deviation, break, difference) is the reason for 
its dynamism as well as its fragility. Even though a phenomenological account 
of normality like Husserl’s does not explicitly emphasize this fragility, it is 
nonetheless a constitutive factor for an established normality. In this regard, I 
will revisit Husserl’s account with a slightly different perspective, not only to 
show that normality is fragile, but also why it necessarily has to be fragile, i.e., 
that normality can only be established because it is fragile.  
In the first part of this paper, I will present and re-visit Husserl’s account of 
normality as concordant and optimal with regard to its dynamic or fragile 
aspects. In the second part of this paper, I will apply this account to recent 
findings in phenomenological pathology regarding schizophrenia and 
depression to show how Husserl’s account could be helpful for differentiating 
between different aspects (such as concordance and optimality) as well as 
genetic levels of (disturbances of) normality.  
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2. Husserl’s dynamic concept of normality 
As a mathematician by profession, Husserl accounts for normality in terms of 
concordance and coherence. Thus, normality is not just an indicator of usual or 
habitual behavior, but first of all a necessary criterion for every possible 
experience. In this sense, normality is characterized by two criteria: the 
concordance of the contents of experience and the inherent relation of every 
ongoing experience to an ideal or relative optimum (Husserl, 2008: 204ff., Text 
Nr. 55/56/57/58, 637-673; Ms. D 13 XII, XIV; cf. Steinbock, 1995a; 1995b: 
123-148; Taipale, 2014: 121-169; Heinämaa, 2013; Heinämaa & Taipale, 
2018). Husserl differentiates between normality on an individual level, i.e., 
concordance (and optimality) with respect to the course of individual 
experiences, and normality on an intersubjective level, i.e., concordance 
between the experiences of an individual and those of the whole intersubjective 
community. Normality, in the strict and stable sense (i.e., a normality that is 
shared by all), is thus only possible when the latter criterion is fulfilled. Thus, 
on an intersubjective level, normality permits a coherent and familiar 
experience while, on an intersubjective level, it establishes a common ground 
or world as the basis for all social interaction and communication. In the 
following section, I will explore individual normality and the genetic levels one 
can, following Husserl, differentiate1. 
 
a) Individual concordance and optimality 
With Husserl, one can argue that normality is a constitutive factor for 
experience on different levels, beginning with the most passive levels of 
receptivity to bodily, practical experience, and finally to doxic levels of belief. 
Within the scope of this paper, I will primarily focus on the first two levels. 
Concordance, for Husserl, is a necessary condition of every objectual 
(German: gegenständlich) experience. To have a concordant experience means 
that what we experience now has to be in accordance with what we have 
experienced before, and that future experiences fit within this line that stretches 
between current experiences and the entirety of the subject’s experiential past. 
                                                          
1 Although Husserl himself did not systematically apply his approach of normality to 
his genetic phenomenology. 
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To constitute such a coherent object perception, concordance has to operate 
already at the level of what Husserl calls the passive temporal and associative 
organization of experience – which Husserl labels the passive synthesis of 
consciousness. In the passive synthesis of consciousness, the formal and 
temporal continuity of perception is guaranteed by the automatic integration of 
new sensations in the temporal horizon of consciousness. With his well-known 
example of the melody, Husserl shows that we would not be able to hear a 
melody or tune, which is a temporal continuity of tones, if we only experienced 
the sounds as an unconnected series of sensual input or points (cf. Husserl, 
1991). Every incoming tone is retained in consciousness and integrated within 
the whole of former experiences: the formerly perceived tone is incorporated 
into a continuity of momentary, gradated retentions, while every new, incoming 
tone is part of a horizon of upcoming or anticipated tones, a horizon of the 
protention of tones to come. Another passive synthesis, the synthesis of 
association, accomplishes a first concordance in terms of content. In the 
synthesis of association, different perceptions of one object or a plurality of 
objects are constantly synthesized into one coherent stream of experience. New 
perceptual input must in this regard  
not only be in concordance with what we shortly experienced before, but also 
with the entire (past and future) experiential horizons of the experiencing 
subject. This circumstance can also be described in terms of motivation, in the 
sense that earlier impressions and perceptions motivate later ones, while the 
former impressions are, in turn, part of the whole experiential history of a 
subject. (Wehrle, 2015b: 131)2 
Perception is considered to be normal when its contents are concordant 
(einstimmig), or “match” with previous contents. This means that every new 
sensual input has to fit within the larger temporal and thematic context of 
perception. Perception already inherits implicit assumptions, as it intends or 
                                                          
2 See Wehrle (2015b) for a similar description of concordance. Such a temporal 
continuity and concordance of experienced contents is precisely what is breaking down 
with regard to pathologies like schizophrenia, as research in phenomenologically 
inspired psychopathology has shown (Gallagher, 2005: 200; Fuchs, 2013: 229-235; 
Bovet & Parnas, 1993: 579-597) and will be discussed in part 2 of this paper. 
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aims at something and thus assumes that this something is the way it appears. 
But this has to prove itself as concordant in the further course of perception. 
When one perceives an external object like a house, for example, one intends 
to see a house, while one actually sees only one side of this house. The sides of 
the house which are not actually perceived are, in Husserl’s terms, not 
presented, but merely appresented or emptily intended (anticipated), and have 
to be actualized or verified in later perceptions. Within such a course of 
perception, all single perceptions or inputs must belong together and be 
concordant to form the coherent and stable object perception of a house. Here 
is another example: Consider when intitial appearances are subsequently 
proven wrong, such as when what appeared to be a human being turns out to be 
a mannequin. Our anticipations have failed since what we currently perceive is 
not in accordance with our former experience—it is different than what we 
expected (cf. Husserl, Ms. D 13, XII, 10-11, 100). In this respect, concordance 
is necessary to establish a stable reference towards an object and to demonstrate 
continuity and coherence over time (Wehrle, 2015b: 131).  
But such deviations or interruptions to the concordant course of perception 
are nonetheless important and necessary. This experienced “negation” (cf. 
Husserl 1973) helps to update our automatic anticipations (perceptional beliefs) 
and thus verifies them in the negative. In such cases of deviation, we feel 
irritation or surprise. If something that we automatically anticipate in 
perception does not show up or suddenly vanishes, we feel irritation and 
experience this anomaly as a deviation from our normal experience. If the 
current experience is in conflict with the previous one, we have to solve this 
conflict in favor of one normality (or reality), while the other will be declared 
an illusion, dream, or exception. Therefore, to remain a concordant course of 
perception, one has the following options: if it’s is just a minor deviation, the 
perceptual system can ignore it. This effect, that one normalizes one’s 
perception by automatically ignoring inconsistent inputs and perceives what 
one accepts or wants to perceive is demonstrated in many psychological studies, 
such as studies of inattentional or change blindness (cf. Mack & Rock, 1998; 
Simons & Chabris, 1999; Simons & Resink, 2005). One can treat the respective 
deviation as a temporary exception and thereby return to one’s former 
normality, while the respective implicit assumptions (biases) stay in place. In 
addition, one can retain one’s overall system of normality, but slightly broaden 
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and adapt it to the new and changing circumstances. With regard to the previous 
example of the mannequin, one retains the assumption that an object that 
looks/behaves like x is a human being, but adds to it that, under certain 
circumstances, a supposed x could also be a y. Finally, one can be forced to 
overthrow one’s normality, reverse it, or establish a new one. For example, 
when a person suddenly perceives the world as “upside down”, they would first 
experience this as a disturbing deviation. However, if this new experience lasts 
for a prolonged or indefinite period of time, a new normality would be 
established.  
On a concrete bodily-practical level, normality as a concordance of 
individual experience manifests itself through habitual and skilled behavior.3 
In the course of a life that is comprised of returning impressions and 
interactions, one acquires skills, practical knowledge, and habits that help 
orientate and familiarize a subject with their environment. This is an aspect 
which Husserl did not explicitly integrate into his approach to normality, but is 
nonetheless crucial in that it characterizes and shapes the concrete and practical 
concordance of individual (as well as intersubjective) experience. In this 
respect, it is worthwhile to turn to Merleau-Ponty’s description of the habitual 
body or body-schema. On a concrete level, all experiences, especially ones that 
are repeated daily, leave lasting traces. That means they not only generate 
                                                          
3 The conditions of normality as concordance are thereby a normal structure of 
consciousness with its passive synthesizing processes and, more concretely, a body 
with normal kinaesthetic functions and abilities. What and how I experience is thereby 
concretely dependent on my bodily conditions. Every appearance and course of 
appearances is thereby strictly correlated to the course of various bodily movements 
(cf. Husserl, 1966: 214-215; Husserl, 2008: 638, 648ff., 662). This rule-governed 
[gesetzmäßig] interrelation between the moving body and the world has to proceed in 
a stable way in order to guarantee a unified perception. The normal body thereby serves 
as a bridge between single-subjective and intersubjective systems of appearances (cf. 
Husserl, 2008: 651). As every human being (at least potentially) has a body with the 
same physical organization and more or less the same functions, we are able to 
automatically retrace the perspectives of others. The bodily perspective of the other is 
as if my body was not here, but there, in the place of the other. For a similar 
argumentation, see Wehrle (2015b: 132).  
“There Is a Crack in Everything”. Fragile Normality  55 
 
specific skills, but moreover form a body-schema4 or body-memory5 comprised 
of the sedimentations of the past experiences of an individual. The repeated 
performance of capacities and skills and the receptive bodily memory together 
form the habitual foundation for every further activity and perception of the 
bodily subject. Normality, on this level, is expressed or manifests itself as an “I 
can” in the Husserlian sense. It is established by the specific abilities of an 
individual that match or fit with the respective environment and makes a 
smooth interaction possible.  
The habitual aspect of the body thus enables the actual acting body to orient 
itself within its environment and thereby guarantees a continuity of its 
movements and experiences. This habitual style of experiencing helps us to 
automatically and self-evidently orient ourselves within our environments and 
thus establishes a practical normality. This guarantees a stable way of being-in-
the-world, on the one hand, and the establishment of a familiar environment, or 
“lifeworld”, as Husserl would say, on the other. The operative habits with their 
implicit rules of daily routines can therefore be understood as the inherent 
practical normativity of experience. Moreover, if we share a common 
environment with other individuals, we develop similar skills and habitualities 
as our fellow subjects, which makes it easier to anticipate their behavior in 
typical situations. Through repeated interaction and shared practices, an 
intersubjective normality can be concretely established that, in turn, facilitates 
cooperation and understanding. Here again, habitual normality can fail. This 
failure of habitual normality is characterized by deviation. Individually, 
                                                          
4 Body schema is a term Merleau-Ponty took over from the psychology of his time (cf. 
Head, 1926; Schilder, 1923; Gelb & Goldstein, 1920) and re-formulated in the spirit of 
gestalt-theory. In this sense, the body schema is not a mere sum of information 
regarding different bodily functions (for example tactile and kinaesthetic sensations), 
but an holistic form of bodily organization in direct reference to its environment: “I 
hold my body as an indivisible possession and I know the position of each of my limbs 
through a body schema (schéma corporel)” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 100-101). Shaun 
Gallagher defines the body schema in this regard as a “system of processes that 
constantly regulate posture and movement – a system of motor-sensory capacities that 
function below the threshold of awareness, and without the necessity of perceptual 
monitoring” (Gallagher, 2005: 234). 
5 The concept of the body memory was introduced by Thomas Fuchs. Cf. Fuchs, 2000: 
71-89; Fuchs, 2012: 9-22. 
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habitual normality fails when a certain habit or behavior does not self-evidently 
lead to the anticipated goal of action. Intersubjectively, habitual normality fails 
when an individual habit no longer maps on to respective social anticipations 
and customs. For example, deviations occur when one enters a different culture 
from the one in which their habits are socialized (cf. Schutz, 1976), or when the 
respective social customs and their inherent implicit norms (i.e., the 
intersubjective community as a whole) have changed, while the individual did 
not. Such experiences can cause deviations either within the individual’s course 
of experience or between the individual and the intersubjective. This can cause 
a person to be alienated from their own experience since former habits, practical 
skills, and knowledge are no longer operative, or no longer function in a self-
evident and implicit way. Instead, one becomes aware of these habits or 
anticipations due to their mismatch with the respective situation, and has to 
compensate with the explicit learning of new skills and habits, that is, adapt to 
the new circumstances (cf. Dreyfus, 1972). This special awareness caused by 
deviations is needed in the long run to keep individual or intersubjective 
concordance, i.e., establish normality. 
While the fragility of the current status of normality is necessary for future 
normality, every abnormality or anomaly can only be defined as a modification 
of (current) normality. According to Husserl, these phenomena can only be 
defined or even recognized in relation to an overarching framework of normal 
experience. Normality is therefore a necessary condition for experience, while 
abnormality is merely a deviation on the basis of normality. A bodily anomaly, 
like a burned finger, leads to deviant sensory experience and has to be seen in 
the context of the overall normal experience of the rest of the sensory system. 
“In comparison to earlier tactile perceptions, the subject experiences those 
stemming from the burned finger as abnormal” (Wehrle, 2015b: 133). The 
subjective body thus necessarily has the desire to re-establish a former 
normality or to create a new normality (through repeated experiences of another 
kind), otherwise it no longer experiences itself or the world as concordant and 
evident, i.e., real. Abnormalities or anomalies are, in this sense, modifications 
of the (previous) normal, or exceptions. For example, a certain unexpected 
content of experience, or the sudden change of the circumstances of perception, 
such as a change in the environmental or bodily conditions of vision, exemplify 
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such modifications (cf. Husserl, 2008: 640; Husserl, 1966: 215). At least, unless 
they are persistent, in which case one must establish a new normal.  
One may ask: Could anything be normal, so long as we get used to it and 
keep it concordant? No, Husserl would say, because there is a second criteria 
in play: optimality. Every perception must not only be concordant, but also 
optimal with regard to the individual’s practical aims and goals in perception 
and action, and must match with the circumstances of the current environment. 
While normality in the sense of concordance is thus the condition of coherent 
experience, normality as optimality serves as the intentional aim of perception 
(Wehrle, 2015b: 134). Thus, normality must not only be constituted, constantly 
stabilized, or re-established, but can also be improved as perception and 
knowledge of the world is never complete and can be enhanced, for example, 
with technology. Husserl differentiates, in this regard, between a relative and 
an absolute optimum. While the former is relative to the interests and goals of 
the individual, the latter refers to the ideal of an optimal (clear and distinctive) 
perception of a thing or world as such (independent of individual interests). The 
definition of a relative optimum thereby changes with regard to the interests 
and professions of its perceivers. “What would count as optimal perception for 
a pedestrian who just passes by a house would not be optimal enough for an 
architect interested in the way that house is built, or a real estate agent who has 
to sell the same house” (Wehrle, 2015b: 134-135). Both the relative and 
absolute optimums call either for subjective conditions or objective 
circumstances, which allow for the best, that is, the most differentiated and 
comprehensive perception of an object. In this sense, one could probably adapt 
to perceive the world “upside down”, but it is debatable in what sense this 
would practically be the best possible way to execute one’s actions, or for 
human beings to perceive and relate to the world in general, regarding their 
upright position and bodily constitution. Another problem comes into play 
when one’s perception of the world radically differs from everyone else’s, 
either all of a sudden or because one is, for example, blind from birth. This 
might well be experienced as concordant from an individual perspective, but 
would deviate from an intersubjective concordance and an intersubjectively 
defined optimality. 
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b) Intersubjective concordance and optimality 
For the constitution of a common world or nature as a basis for joint action and 
communication, it is necessary to have an inventory of normal bodies [Bestand 
an normalen Leibern], that is, bodies which are functioning in an orthoaesthetic 
way (Husserl, Ms. D 13 XII, 90; Wehrle, 2015b: 133). The experience of the 
blind “deviates in a consistent way from the proven or true world of experience 
of others” (Husserl, 2008: 657), as Husserl argues. In the same way, Husserl 
discusses frequent cases of abnormal perceptions as borderline cases; he counts 
the experience of blind people, “mad” people, children, and animals among 
these cases. The experience of the blind person is not only discordant with the 
average perception of a community of subjects. Rather, there is a qualitative 
argument hidden here, as Husserl argues that the blind person must submit to 
mainstream intersubjective knowledge because “the better truth, the better law 
is to be found on the side of the normal human community” (Husserl, 2008: 
657)6.  
Normal bodily as well as mental constitutions and functions (i.e., those that 
are shared by most) are in this sense the measure for a common experience of 
the world, which, in turn, serves as a basis for action and communication. In 
this regard, Husserl would interpret the experience of, for example, a blind 
subject as “abnormal” only insofar it “deviates in a consistent way from the 
proven or true world of the experience of others.”7 While from an individual 
level the experience of a blind person is as concordant and stable as that of a 
                                                          
6 Perception, especially in the realm of intersubjectivity and science, tends towards a 
general optimum, a normative goal of an adequate perception. For this, a normal bodily 
constitution is a prerequisite: Husserl speaks in this sense of a “biophysical optimum” 
or even an “organic teleology” (Husserl, Ms. D13 XIV, 13). The blind person’s 
perception is in this sense poorer, “his vision is less differentiated, blurred etc. than the 
normal perceiver’s and both of them know this” (Husserl, 2008: 658).  
7 Husserl, 2008: 657. In the same way, Husserl discusses constant cases of abnormal 
perceptions as borderline cases. In fact, he counts the experience of blind people, mad 
people, children, and animals among these cases. These groups of living creatures are 
thus excluded from the intersubjective sense-constitution of the world. For a more 
detailed discussion of Husserl’s transcendental argument, see Heinämaa, 2013. 
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seeing person, it is discordant with the average perception of a community of 
(seeing) subjects. Even more importantly, it is discordant with optimal 
perception as an epistemic norm, which calls for the right subjective-bodily 
conditions and abilities (free movement, perceptual quality, etc.), as well as for 
the best “objective” circumstances (such as lighting conditions and perceptual 
distance). Normality is therefore not only to be defined as intersubjective 
concordance, but follows, at the same time, the scale of an optimal perception 
of the world. Thus, while one can imagine an entirely colour-blind population 
(cf. Husserl, Ms. D 13 XIV, 31), Husserl assumes, upon meeting a population 
of people who can see colour, the colour-blind population would acknowledge 
that perception with color is better suited for a differentiated and true perception 
of the world.8 Husserl strongly believes that every perception is teleologically 
oriented not only towards a relative but also towards an absolute optimum, i.e., 
an adequate perception.9 However, most concrete, intersubjective optima, as 
well as individual optima, are relative with regard to environmental, and thus 
also social and cultural, circumstances. While individual optima are relative 
with respect to the subject’s current actions, interests, or habitual style of 
experiences, relative optima on an intersubjective level are based on common 
interests, needs, and goals of action on the one side and on a culturally formed 
style of experiencing on the other.  
Normality, one can conclude, is the result of an ordering or synthesizing 
process within experience that has a normal structure of consciousness as well 
as a normal constitution of the body as its conditions. A totally non-normal or 
                                                          
8 For a critical discussion of the ethical dubiousness of Husserl’s ideal of an absolute 
optimum – as an adequate perception or a rational striving towards an ever more clear 
and distinct perception (stemming from the rational influence of Descartes) - cf. 
Heinämaa, 2013; Wehrle, 2010. 
9 Leaving the problem aside of whether such an objective measure of optimality is even 
possible and if so, how we could be able to decide what is objectively optimal, one can 
opt for a less rationalistic interpretation and try to understand objective optimality 
anthropologically, i.e., with regard to the best possible existence of an organism within 
a respective environment (cf. Canguilhem, 1991). In this sense there is no optimality as 
such, as there is no health or sickness as such (see also Jaspers, 1973), but only better 
or worse conditions of life for respective living creatures that are not indifferent to these 
conditions. 
60   Maren Wehrle 
unordered experience is, at least for Husserl, not imaginable since, as the name 
suggests, everything that is abnormal can only be grasped and defined as a 
deviation from or modification of the normal condition. The normal must 
therefore always already be presupposed. Nonetheless, and here the paradox of 
every investigation of the normal comes to the fore, this very deviation must 
come first if the experiencing subject wants to become aware of or investigate 
normality as such. Normality, even though a presupposition for every coherent 
or meaningful experience, can only be experienced in retrospect and implicitly 
through a deviation, interruption, break, or the disappointment of an 
anticipation. Every time Husserl concretely describes normality, he must 
therefore turn to its deviations and modifications. This is where 
psychopathology comes into play, since only through an observation of the 
abnormal can we explain the normal (Jaspers, 1973: 49). Normality and its 
underlying implicit norms are only recognized as such “when they are broken”, 
for “functions are revealed only when they fail”, as Canguilhem emphasized. 
Although such deviations or failures already imply a certain normality that was 
already at play, this normality together with its “immanent norms”, as 
Elisabetta Basso defines them (Basso, 2012: 168, 169)10, “rises to the 
consciousness and science of itself only through maladaptation, failure and 
pain” (Canguilhem 1991, 209). Indeed, the phenomena of disease or 
psychological illness is a constant provocation for a phenomenology which is 
oriented around the paradigm of normality (cf. Luft, 2008: 49). However, this 
paradox can only come into view through a phenomenological description (cf. 
Jaspers, 1973). 
 
 
                                                          
10 Immanent norms are thereby inscribed in experiences and function as internal rules 
that guide experience, and are also constituted and retained within experience, i.e., 
through repeated interactions with the environment that results in skills or habits, such 
as in the acquirement of new motoric and perceptual sense/meaning. Basso explains 
this with a citation by Merleau-Ponty, who states that there is no external unfolding or 
pre-existing reason or norm to begin with, and there is no external condition of a norm, 
but only “the birth of a norm” within the interaction of the bodily subject and the world. 
Cf. Basso, 2012: 168f; cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 62. 
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3. Psychopathological disturbances of normality 
I will now show how a revisited Husserlian account of normality can be 
fruitfully applied to the diagnosis or explanation of psychopathological 
experiences. Based on the genetic schema of normality developed above, one 
can differentiate between disturbances of normality on the most fundamental 
passive-receptive stages (temporal concordance), object perception, and 
practical and habitual behavior, as well as interests and beliefs (although the 
latter is not the topic of this paper). These genetic levels are thereby not to be 
considered as completely separate or distinct, but are “normally” intertwined 
and influence each other respectively. Nonetheless, the more genetically 
fundamental the disturbances are, the more they will influence the other levels 
of normal experience. While disturbances at the level of dis-concordant or 
deviating beliefs can leave the underlying workings of temporal experience 
intact, the converse would probably not be the case. Furthermore, such 
disturbances have consequences for both individual and intersubjective 
normality. While an individual concordance can still be established within 
some pathologies (although with much explicit and reflective effort), they 
radically deviate from intersubjective normality, i.e., what most people 
perceive, do, and believe, and thus result in social isolation. In this sense, one 
could also ask where the disturbances originate: does a social disturbance lead 
to more fundamental fragmentations of experience? Or is a dis-concordance of 
temporal experience at the heart of most “higher-order” disturbances of 
normality? 
In what follows, I will not be able to settle or even adequately address these 
questions, but rather try to review and classify pathological findings in the light 
of such an account of normality. Concretely, I will discuss research in 
psychopathology which traces major symptoms of schizophrenia and 
depression back to fundamental disturbances of temporal organization and 
experience. I will argue, in this regard, that one can use Husserl’s criteria of 
concordance and optimality to descriptively differentiate between the 
respective disturbances: While schizophrenia is primarily characterized by a 
disruption of the fundamental temporal concordance (which has consequences 
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for the other levels of normality, including the deviation from intersubjective 
normality), the symptoms of depression can best be explained by a lack of the 
inherent aim of behavior and perception, that is, its tendency towards 
optimality.  
However, in order to explain the respective phenomena properly, I will have 
to once again revisit or broaden Husserl’s account of normality. In doing so, I 
will connect his notion of optimality to his genetic account of an operative-
bodily or drive intentionality that expresses itself as a striving or tendency (cf. 
Husserl 1973, Husserl 1966; Wehrle 2015a), and illustrate this with Merleau-
Ponty’s description of a bodily intentionality, i.e., his notion of the intentional 
arc. 
 
a) Schizophrenia as disturbance of “concordance”  
Along with current research in phenomenological psychopathology (cf. Fuchs, 
2013; Maiese 2018; cf. Gallagher, 2015; Bovet & Parnas, 1993: 584), one can 
argue that symptoms of schizophrenia are best described as disturbances of the 
concordant temporal organization of experiences. Several well-documented 
symptoms of this pathological condition, like movement disorders involving a 
lack of self-monitoring, forward-monitoring, or preparatory movements, or 
cognitive disorders such as unwanted, disconnected, or inserted thoughts or 
hallucinations, are characterized by a lack of agency (Gallagher, 2005: 174f.). 
The respective patients, for example, report that their movements are caused or 
even made by someone or something else (cf. Frith, 1992: 66), or that their 
thoughts are not intended but externally inserted. Such a lack of agency in 
bodily as well as cognitive domains can be explained by an underlying 
interruption of the “constitutive synthesis of time consciousness” (cf. Fuchs, 
2013: 75) or, more specifically, the breakdown of the protentional or 
anticipatory function.  
To guarantee a sense that movements as well as thoughts are generated or 
intended by oneself, they have not only to be connected retrospectively with 
previous movements or thoughts but within the experience of a melody or a 
movement in which the next tone or movement must proactively be anticipated 
or aimed at. The incoming impressions, according to Husserl, are thus 
embedded in a temporal field of retention-impression and protention. 
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Impressions are thus not only continuously modified into a retention and 
integrated into the continuum of retentions. In addition, on this basis of 
retentions or former experience, we already await the upcoming impression and 
thus anticipate it. This could be just a formal and vague awaiting or protentional 
tendency in the sense that something is about to come, or a rather a specific 
anticipation more determinate in content. When we, for example, actually 
perceive the front side of a house, we anticipate to see a back side that is, in its 
shape, color, and design, similar to the front side. When we then instead see no 
real back side because the supposed house was just a part of film scenery, the 
anticipation or intention is disappointed. Nonetheless, the underlying 
protentional structure is intact (i.e., that there is something about to see), while 
it is just the content of the respective anticipation which does not match with 
previous perceptions. When, however, the formal protentional structure as such 
has broken down, and thus the overarching continuity and concordance, every 
new input is experienced as sudden, surprising, overwhelming, and even 
penetrating, in that it bears no connection to our former experience.  
Thoughts, for example, would appear to come from nowhere, although they 
appear in my stream of experience. One would be able to make sense of them 
only in retrospect, but not as something self-generated. As Gallagher explains, 
“Protention normally puts me in the forefront of my thoughts and allows me to 
take them up as my own product, as they develop. Lacking protention, thoughts 
would seem to impose themselves on me” (Gallagher, 2005: 194). The same 
holds true for actions and movements. In an experiment were the EEG signals 
with regard to self-generated vs. externally generated tones were measured 
(Frith & Done, 1988; Shafer & Marcus, 1973; Posada et al., 2001), in contrast 
to normal participants, schizophrenic patients showed no significant difference 
in response. The schizophrenic patients did not expect the tone, even when they 
generated it themselves.11 This is in line with observations from earlier 
phenomenological psychopathologists like Minkowski, who described 
behavior of schizophrenic patients as characterized by “fixed acts”, 
                                                          
11 In the same sense, it is reported that respective patients show difficulties in planning 
and initiating action (Levin, 1984), voluntary movement (Singh et al, 1992), temporal 
organization (DePue, Dubicki & McCarthy, 1975), and self-temporalization (Bovet & 
Parnas, 1993). 
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“purposeless acts”, and “acts that have no concern for tomorrow” (Minkowski, 
1933; cf. Gallagher, 2005: 196). 
To explain the disruption of the protentional function in its concrete form, 
one can turn to Merleau-Ponty and his descriptions of the intentional arc, which 
constitutes the continuity of lived time (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 137f.). 
Merleau-Ponty thereby takes Husserl’s theory of inner time consciousness as a 
starting point, but ties it not to consciousness but to concrete bodily movements 
and interactions with the world. Thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, temporal 
constitution concretely takes place in the lived body’s actual performance of 
movements, which integrate, in turn, the dimensions of past, present, and future 
by means of an intentional arc. In this regard, bodily movement always points 
beyond itself, spatially and temporally. While engaged in a bodily movement, 
we are “here”, but also already “there”; that is to say, we are already 
anticipating the thing or action that drives our intentional project of activity. 
This inherent temporality of bodily intentionality is illustrated by the gesture of 
pointing: “The gesture of reaching one’s hand out toward an object contains a 
reference to this object, not as a representation, but as this highly determinate 
thing toward which we are thrown, next to which we are through anticipation, 
and which we haunt” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 140).  
In schizophrenic patients, the passive temporal synthesis is disturbed, which 
results in a fragmentation of experience12. This would, for example, explain 
why patients struggle to follow a conversation or focus on a train of thought as 
they no longer experience them as coherent and meaningful wholes: temporal 
                                                          
12 This implies not only a disturbance in external perception, movement, and thinking, 
but also with regard to the normal or concordant relation to one’s self. Temporal 
experience and organization is, in this sense, tied to the lived body and implies a pre-
reflective self-awareness, as Zahavi argues (cf. Zahavi, 2003: 2018). Disturbances 
within these passive stages of normality thus lead not only to a fragmentation of hetero 
experience but also of (bodily) self-experience (Zahavi & Parnas, 1998; Legrand, 
2006). In hearing a melody, I do not only hear concordant tones, but I am immediately 
affected (cf. Depraz, 1994: 75) and thus experience them as heard by me: “The tone is 
not only given as having-just-been, but as having-just-been experienced [by someone, 
auth. amendment]“ (Zahavi, 2003: 172). In this regard, schizophrenic patients do not 
only feel alienated by their actions and thoughts, but also from their affects, body, and 
skin (cf. Gallagher, 2005: 204). 
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gaps occur and there is an inability to anticipate what comes next (as in a 
melody or conversation), and this renders the occurrence of events too rapid, 
causing the patients to feel overwhelmed and even intruded upon by external 
events or their own thoughts. With a disturbance of the intentional arc, which 
is the overarching temporal synthesis that allows for concordance, one loses the 
ability to actively direct one’s actions towards the future: one is stuck in that-
which-has-just-passed. Most patients thus have to focus on what just occurred, 
i.e., the sensory feedback of one’s just-passed movement (cf. Fuchs, 2013: 86). 
That is the reason why experiences no longer feel as if they were one’s own. 
One could say that consciousness, or one’s bodily self, is continually surprised 
by itself, and that is why schizophrenics often experience their own movements 
as controlled by others or their own thoughts as if inserted or manipulated from 
without (Wehrle, 2018).  
Protentional disturbances thus lead to a “disintegration and alienation of 
routine units of activity”, and this forces patients, in turn, to produce “every 
single movement intentionally: the body’s implicit knowledge has been lost, 
and its place taken by ‘hyper-reflexive’ self-observation and self-control” 
(Fuchs, 2013: 90). The lacking concordance in the passive organization of 
reception thus also results in a lack of general optimality. Upcoming 
impressions are not only dis-concordant with previous experience, but the 
whole structure of experience and action lacks the connection to an inherent 
optimum. As a result, one is no longer able to aim or strive at something, 
perception is no longer self-induced but is surprised and thus always comes too 
late, and one can longer act but is doomed to react. This results in a radical 
break in one’s affective attunement to the world which must be 
overcompensated with explicit, that is, intellectual, aspects.  
The immanent fragility of normality here turns radical and becomes 
threatening: as it cannot be passively constituted, retained, or adapted, patients 
have to try to explicitly establish a second-order normality in order to regain an 
overall concordance and keep control over their experience. In schizophrenic 
patients, this mode of explicit temporal experience, self-relation, and behavior 
tries to compensate for the lost temporal, perceptional, and bodily concordance. 
But this attempt is doomed to fail because this “new normality” cannot be 
termed as such, since it lacks the sense of usualness, effortlessness, and self-
evidence which is characteristic of every normality. Furthermore, this intensive 
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engagement in creating a concordance and a narrative for one’s life hinders one 
from spontaneously acting and being open to future possibilities. Thus, the 
prize of gaining a concordant narrative is the loss of a self-set aim or optimum 
in experience. Moreover, such a constructed, hyperreflective, and narrative 
normality deviates on several levels with intersubjective normality and thus 
leads to social disturbances or the social isolation of the respective patients. 
 
b) Depression as a disturbance of “optimality” 
While schizophrenia could be phenomenologically described as a major 
disturbance of the criteria of concordance at the lowest genetic level (the 
passive-receptive stage of normality), in depression, this formal concordance 
in temporal experience seems to remain intact. Depressive patients have, in this 
regard, no fundamental disturbances in movement: they have no problems with 
initiating, observing, or planning movements. Nor do depressive patients have 
disturbances in temporal experience as such, i.e., in following their own stream 
of thoughts or an external conversation. The observed symptoms in depressive 
disorders are rather characterized as “lack of motivation”, including the loss of 
libido, appetite, or drive, or a sense of hopelessness or pointlessness (cf. Smith, 
2013: 615). In contrast to schizophrenic patients, it is not the unexpected 
intrusion of the future into their present which leaves depressive patients 
paralyzed, but rather the lack of forward-looking or protentional striving. In this 
sense, one could argue that both are trapped in the present or cut off from the 
future, but in very different ways.13 
Fuchs and Maiese argue in this regard that depression can also be 
understood by a disturbance of the protentional factor of temporal organization 
or implicit time, as Fuchs defines it (cf. Fuchs, 2013; Maiese, 2018).14 Fuchs 
                                                          
13 Cf. Maiese argues that depressive patients are stuck or trapped in the present. I would 
argue in this regard that while schizophrenic patients are violently trapped, depressive 
patients suffer from a stagnation and thus get stuck. Cf. Maiese, 2018. 
14 Depression can thus not be primarily characterized by a feeling or an affective 
relation of guilt (cf. Ratcliffe, 2010), or a lack of (social) care, as Maiese points out, 
because the first explanation differs within cultures, while the later has to be regarded 
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thereby differentiates between two components of the pre-reflective experience 
of lived time, namely synthesis and conation. The latter is described by Fuchs 
as a vital or affective force. While synthesis is affected for patients of 
schizophrenia, depressive patients suffer from a weakened conation. Fuchs uses 
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the intentional arc to illustrate this difference: while 
the arc is disrupted or breaks down entirely in the case of schizophrenia, the arc 
becomes lame or loses its tension in the case of depression. Applying our 
scheme of normality, one could argue that the first case can primarily be 
characterized by a lack of concordance, while the latter can be characterized by 
the lack of an inherent reference to an optimum. 
In this sense, we have to revisit and broaden Husserl’s account of normality 
with regard to his criteria of an optimum. Connecting this notion with Husserl’s 
genetic phenomenology, we can understand optimality primarily as a forward 
looking, bodily, and practical striving towards the world and things that is 
informed and motivated by our needs, interests, and desires. In this regard, we 
do not merely perceive things, but are involved with them and concerned by 
them, i.e., they are significant and practically important to us. Only secondarily, 
on the level of object perception, can an optimum be understood as representing 
determinate or objective features of an object. Moreover, if normality relies on 
an inherent striving for optimality, this means that the experiencing subject or 
organism is not indifferent to their conditions and thus is inherently normative, 
as Canguilhem emphasized, while the respective normal experience is 
necessarily not only concordant but also selective in character15.  
                                                          
merely as a consequence of the disturbance of protentional function, and is thus a 
secondary phenomenon (cf. Maiese, 2018: 707f.). 
15 Even on the lowest levels of perceptual organization, there has to be a selective 
structuring of the field of experience: a differentiation between the horizon and a focus 
or theme of perceptions, as well as between foreground and background consciousness. 
Perception, in this sense, is never neutral but selective from the start. One can find 
empirical support for this selectivity in research on inattentional and change blindness. 
In experimental conditions where we should see something prominent like a woman 
dressed up as a gorilla in the middle of our visual field, subjects just do not see it, 
because they are involved in counting the passes of the basketball players. So, from a 
third-person perspective, this perception is highly selective and even exclusionary, but 
from the first-person-perspective of the perceiver it is concordant with their current 
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To guarantee a normal, that is, a coherent and meaningful, experience, 
concordance is thus not enough, but needs an inherent motivation and openness 
towards future possibilities, i.e., a striving for an optimum. The criteria of 
optimality can thus be concretely understood as a bodily and affective 
intentionality (cf. Slaby, 2008) or striving with a forward looking motivational 
structure (cf. Thompson, 2007: 362) or “teleological direction” (Ratcliffe, 
2012: 122), i.e., an inherent openness to the future.  
Such an affectively framed “forward looking trajectory” (cf. Maiese, 2018), 
striving, tendency, or openness to future possibilities is precisely what is 
lacking in patients with depression, according to Fuchs and Maiese. Depression 
as a long-term affective condition or “deep emotion” (cf. Ratcliffe, 2010) 
thereby shapes the overall way we are related to the world, what kind of 
significances we are receptive to, and what matters to us. Without a striving 
towards an intended or imagined future, a concrete aiming towards things that 
we regard as significant (over others), everything seems equally relevant or 
irrelevant. As the early phenomenological psychiatrist Minkowski would 
describe it, “It is the orientation of our life toward the future which gives it a 
meaning, a direction; when this orientation is missing, everything seems to 
amount to the same thing, seems stupid, without rhyme or reason” (Minkowski, 
1970: 303). When one’s future is in this sense blocked, one finds oneself stuck 
in the past, i.e., in stagnation. This is often accompanied with boredom 
(Ratcliffe, 2010: 611), or a sense of hopelessness or pointlessness (Jacobs et al., 
2014). In this regard, as Maiese points out, it is not that patients merely cease 
to hope, but rather that they lose the ability to imagine a concrete future 
(content-wise) and, as a result, fail to imagine what they would do or how they 
would feel at a specific point or situation in their future (Maiese, 2018: 710; 
McKenzie, 2000: 126). One could say that, in depression, one is nostalgically 
related to a meaningful past instead of a meaningful future, but this does not 
seem to be correct. When we lack concrete interests, desires, or needs with 
respect to the future, there are, in turn, no salient future possibilities or 
                                                          
actions and interest. They focus on what is relevant for their task and a gorilla falls 
outside of this as long as she is not able to play basketball (cf. Simons and Resink, 
2005). 
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significant events. Speaking with Merleau-Ponty, one could say that if the 
intentional arc loses its tension, this affects the whole temporal experience and 
not only one’s relation to the future. Concretely, which past seems relevant to 
us or how events matter to us always “depends heavily on the ways we are 
heading” (Ratcliffe, 2012: 129). 
Such a lack of concrete future directedness, which necessarily implies an 
inherent relation to practical aims or optima, in turn, leads to a dominance of 
habitual patterns of behavior. In normal experience, habit enables normality in 
the sense of concordance, such that it generates familiarity and orientation. 
However, in depressive states, the constraining aspects of habit become 
predominant. While “normal” habit or the habitual body, as Merleau-Ponty has 
shown, can be regarded as creative in that it establishes a new motoric meaning 
or skill (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 143f.) that can be applied in various contexts 
and remains flexible and open to new circumstances, habitual behavior in 
depressive patients is limited to routine responses and severely limits any 
flexible and spontaneous responses to the environment. Under normal 
conditions, we develop a habitual style of experience according to past 
experiences, which provides the basis for our selective and affective relation to 
the world and thus motivates future experiences and helps make them 
significant. In depression, however, habit loses this function. 
In the same sense that the past loses its meaning when it is no longer 
affectively connected to the future, habit loses its motivating function when 
disconnected from current desires, actions, or future plans. Motor behavior is 
thus merely drawn to certain patterns within the environment (cf. Juarrero, 
1999: 153f.), mental dispositions fixate on the negative, and the behavior of 
devaluing oneself, as well as habitual affective responses like alienation, grief, 
or anxiety, (Jacobs et al., 2014: 100ff.) seem fixed. These states do not flexibly 
adapt and can no longer be willingly changed. 
This conative disturbance of the protentional structure, or the lack of an 
inherent optimum or normativity, not only has consequences for individual 
normality but also manifests as a deviation from intersubjective normality. 
With respect to temporal experience, Fuchs argues that, under normal 
conditions, the temporalities of individual living and operating bodies are 
synchronized into an “intersubjective now” (Fuchs, 2013: 82), and thus into 
intercorporeal resonance. Because of the lack of the inherent protentional 
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striving, however, depressive subjects get desynchronized from the external 
world and from others. A commonly observed form of comportment in patients 
with depressive disorder is that they move slowly (Jacobs et al., 2014: 99) and 
experience their bodies as heavy, static, and even as a burden (cf. Fuchs, 2013: 
96). From this follows a “temporal mismatch” between their individual course 
of time and those of the outer world. Time is thus explicitly experienced as a 
“loss of simultaneity” (Fuchs, 2013: 83). The patients feel as if they are “falling 
or lagging behind” (Fuchs, 2013: 94) as they are literally out of tune and thus 
no longer able to participate in social life and intersubjective interactions.  
 
4. Conclusion 
As I have tried to show, fragility, or inherent instability, is an essential aspect 
of every normality. Deviations, interruptions, or irritations of the current status 
of normality are thus necessary for constituting or establishing a future 
normality, i.e., to make normality sustainable and open for change and 
adaptation. While abnormalities or anomalies can only be defined as a 
modification of (current) normality, research on normality is likewise heavily 
dependent on this inherent fragility, since we can only grasp or become aware 
of normality through an experience of this very deviation. This is why we need 
psychopathology in order to be able to define or classify what is normal, as 
Merleau-Ponty famously emphasized, among many others. 
But this observation seems rather cynical when we turn to the subjects or 
patients who actually suffer from pathological experiences. In the concrete 
context of psychopathology, the fragility of normality is an existential risk or 
problem. Normality, from the first-person perspective of experiencing patients 
or subjects, is something that is desired and needed, and the loss of which 
causes suffering. Normalization, i.e., the implicit or explicit process of 
constituting normality within individual and intersubjective experience, is in 
this regard necessary and needed, i.e. having “too little” normality thus seems 
to be an existential problem and risk. 
But if we now change perspectives and take a critical stance from without, 
as for example in a critical discursive or social genealogy like that of Michel 
Foucault, the situation radically changes. When normality is investigated as a 
discursive historical term that expresses the dominant forms of power, it is not 
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something established within experience, but rather the result of a process of 
an external normalization according to dominant social or discursive norms. 
Along these norms—or even normality in the form of a measured average that 
functions as a norm—individual behavior is evaluated, classified, disciplined, 
conformed, or optimized, i.e., made normal. For example, in current neoliberal 
societies where subjects have internalized the norms and ideals of progress and 
success, we are happy to normalize and optimize ourselves to not fall or lag 
behind in the competitive race of private, economic success and recognition (cf. 
Oksala, 2016). In this sense, everything that is different or deviates from the 
dominant norm is either sanctioned or—when it cannot be normalized—
excluded, and thus considered pathological.  
In his early work, Michel Foucault described how the concept of modern 
rationality (as normality) necessarily depends, in its definition as well as its 
stability, on its excluded counterpart: madness (cf. Foucault, 2006). In this 
sense, he unmasked the fragility of normality in showing the immense effort 
and creativity humans invested at different times to hide and overcompensate 
by means of defining, classifying, fixating, producing, and separating the 
normal from the pathological. In his later works, Foucault analyzed different 
practices of normalization as respective strategies of modern power, namely 
discipline, biopolitics, and governmentality (cf. Foucault, 1991a; 2006; 1980; 
1991b). From such a historical and power-sensitive perspective, the risk or 
problem would not be too little but rather “too much (or a too stable) 
normality”. 
In this regard, the fragility of normality could be understood as the “crack 
that is in everything”, a little space where “the light gets in”16, i.e., a chance for 
freedom. While the fragility of normality always bears the risk of 
fragmentation, alienation, and pathology, this might also be the reason why 
experience can never be completely normalized or made to conform, thereby 
leaving space for new, different, and deviant experiences. In this regard, we 
must be affectively open for the pathological experiences of others, which are 
not so different from our normal ones, but perhaps just a radicalization of our 
                                                          
16 See Leonard Cohen’s song “Anthem”: “There is a crack in everything, that how the 
light gets in.” 
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already-inherent tendencies. Indeed, this offers the possibility to accept our 
inherent fragility and vulnerability, to admit that this could happen to us as well, 
and that normality is always just a breath away from disruption. We must 
therefore listen to the voices and experiences of those who deviate from what 
we are used to, not only because we need them to define what normality 
amounts to, but also to adjust and broaden our scope of normality, and to create 
a livable and shared normality for the future. 
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